Its no secret that China is willing to influence and undermine U.S. interests and national security by any means possible. On May 11, Eileen Wang, the mayor of Arcadia, Calif., resigned after pleading guilty to acting as a foreign agent for China, marking the latest high-profile example of the extent of our foreign adversaries intelligence operations.
The Chinese Communist Party is targeting U.S. lawmakers and officials, from the state and local levels to our nations capital. But not every target of foreign subversion efforts is as easy to compromise as, for instance, failed presidential and California gubernatorial candidate and former representative for Californias 14th Congressional District â Democrat Eric Swalwell. Foreign intelligence assets are equally determined to gain access to principals’ aides and staff, a reality that rarely makes national headlines. Â
In 2022, a compromised staffer for a Northern Virginia congressman was fired after the employee made repeated attempts to schedule meetings with other congressional offices at the behest of the Chinese Embassy, in order to lobby for the CCPs priorities.
The U.S. Capitol campus, despite all the visible public security measures, belies the truth that it is still relatively open access for the American people and foreigners alike. Lawmakers and staff, on a regular basis, also often have engagements with foreign diplomats, who each have their own agendas that go beyond small talk at receptions.
Even foreign entities that may not appear threatening at face value are oftentimes soft power and intelligence conduits for adversarial state actors. -aligned entities, posing as religious or non-political organizations, sought meetings with congressional offices last year, to disseminate Kremlin propaganda and sway U.S. policy.
In a similar manner, individuals with academic credentials with strong ties to the Iranian regime have tried to influence congressional offices to advocate for sanctions relief. These individuals, well known in Beltway circles, strive to gain access to lawmakers and their staff and successfully exploit loopholes under the Foreign Agent Registration Act.
The point here is not that members and their staff are totally oblivious to the threat posed by foreign agents. In fact, on May 9, it was reported that a would-be CCP spy had offered $10,000 to a staffer on the Select Committee on China in return for insider information. The staffer promptly reported the incident, and the committee referred it to the for further investigation. Still, this shows that foreign agents can be subtle as well as bold in their attempts to gain access to classified information or compromise a target.
Whats clearly needed is a far more serious focus on deterring the threat posed by foreign intelligence operations. For this reason, I, along with House Permanent Select Committee on , R-Ark., have introduced the Stop Talking to Other People (STOP) Resolution.
This resolution would require the to establish a training program for both members of Congress and staff with access to classified information to undergo counterintelligence training and information protection best practices. Many would be surprised that such a program does not already exist for Congress.
In the interest of , we cannot afford to neglect giving our public servants the know-how and resources to combat foreign intelligence threats here in the workplace. After all, in
